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Resumen: 
Estamos inmersos en un proceso de armonización del globo educativo, en una política educativa 
mundial. PISA representa su más distinguido instrumento. Esta nueva gobernación mundial tiene sus 
raíces en el medio cultural del contexto de la Guerra Fría. El fracaso de las iniciativas educativas 
condujo a un nuevo modelo de gobernación en el cual se estandarizaron los exámenes a gran escala 
surgidos como el instrumento principal en la gobernación educativa, como PISA. Mi tesis de 
conclusión es que precisamente porque la idea de gobernación global está arraigada en una cultura 
específica, los instrumentos desarrollados corren el riesgo de afectar sólo a estructuras formales en 
otras culturas. Cerraré mi presentación preguntando qué desafíos esperan a la investigación en 
educación ante estos acontecimientos. 
 
_____________ 
1 Conferencia inaugural en la Universidad de Luxemburgo, Campus de Limpertsberg, 17 Febrero, 
2009  
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Abstract: 
We are immersed in a process of harmonization of the educational globe, in a “world polity”.  PISA 
represents its most distinguished instrument. This new global governance has its roots in a specific 
cultural milieu in the time of the Cold War. The failure of the educational initiatives led to a new 
governance model in which standardized large-scale testing emerged as the chief instrument in 
educational governance, such as PISA.  My concluding thesis is that precisely because the idea of 
global governance is rooted in a specific culture, its developed instruments run the risk of affecting 
only formal structures in other cultures. I will close my presentation by asking what challenges 
awaits research in education in the face of these developments. 
Key words: PISA, Global governance, Output steering, Culture of testing, educational research. 
 
In the past two or three decades we have been witnessing an ongoing worldwide 
assimilation of the different national educational systems. This process has been promoted by 
international organizations such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund 
investing millions of dollars in the school systems of poorer countries on condition that 
organizational structures and governance systems that proved to be successful in the rich 
countries are implemented. The effects of this global governance are quite tangible. 
Sociologists describe this process as “world institutionalization of education” (Meyer & 
Ramirez, 2000) with standardized ideas about organizational structures, compulsory 
schooling, curricula, and professionally trained teachers resulting in an educational “world 
polity” (Meyer, Boli, & Thomas, 1994). 
 These developments have evoked criticism. Some critics accuse educational policy 
makers as string puppets of the global economy, reducing students to measurable results. 
Other critics have argued that in any case the global dissemination of ideals, goals, and 
means is limited only to formal structures – in other words to polity issues – and hardly effect 
the inner activities of education, such as for example classroom instruction (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Meyer & Rowan, 1978; Meyer & Ramirez, 2000). The same critics have also pointed to 
the fact that this form of globalization is to be understood as a spread of western ideas rather 
than a global consensus between equal partners – ideas that were successful only because 
they were promoted by the money provided by the different governmental and non-
governmental organizations and new international educational bureaucracies like UNESCO or 
UNICEF (Chabbott, 2003). 
 What is being criticized here on a global scale can well be applied to the west itself. 
The western systems are by no means harmonized, but they, too, are on the way. It is 
sufficient to mention the Bologna Process, aiming at the creation of a harmonized European 
Higher Education Area by 2010, and similar attempts on lower school levels in single countries 
with decentralized structures1. Whereas on a global scale the World Bank and other 
international organizations are the promoters of world polity, for the western sphere it is the 
International Association for Educational Assessment (IAEA) and, most of all, the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, the OECD, particularly with its comparative test 
instrument, the Program for International Student Assessment, known as PISA. 
                                                 
1 Countries like Germany or Switzerland are trying to harmonize primary education through 
specific institutions such as the Conference of the German Cultural Ministers 
(Kultusministerkonferenz) and the Swiss Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Education 
(Schweizerische Konferenz der Kantonalen Erziehungsdirektoren). 
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 I am interested in this process of harmonization and its assumed limitations to formal 
structures only and, conversely, in its weak capability to have the effects that it is aiming for: 
namely, to improve formal education, respectively enhance school quality. Within the given 
limits of this presentation, I will narrow my scope on the western world only and to its most 
distinguished instrument, PISA. My general thesis is that the motives of the new global 
educational governance are rooted in a specific cultural milieu in the time of the Cold War, 
more precisely in the late 1950s, heading to a harmonious world. My more specific thesis is 
that a series of failures in the achievement of this harmonized globe led to reforms in 
educational governance, leading eventually to the development of instruments like large-
scale assessments, such as PISA. And my concluding thesis is that precisely because the idea 
of global governance is rooted in a specific culture, its developed instruments run the risk of 
affecting only formal structures in other cultures. I will support my theses in five steps. First, 
I will analyze some characteristics of PISA as prominent tokens in the harmonizing of the 
educational globe (1.). Then I will focus on the emergence of these characteristics in the 
context of the 1950s and its vision of global development (2.). In the third step I will 
reconstruct how the shock of Sputnik led to educationalization of this global vision and focus 
on the major agency of this concept, the OECD (3.). In the fourth step I will illustrate how the 
failure of the educational initiatives led to a new governance model in which standardized 
large-scale testing emerged as the chief instrument in educational governance (4.). I will 
close my presentation by asking what challenges awaits research in education in the face of 
these developments (5.). 
 
1. PISA and the harmonizing of the educational globe 
 PISA characterizes the basic concern to measure how well 15-year-old adults are 
prepared to meet the “challenges of today’s knowledge society” (OECD, 2001, p. 14). 
However, what these “challenges” are and what “today’s knowledge society” means are not 
defined. At least, the reader learns that these assumed challenges could be met successfully 
with selected competencies. Since exclusively competencies in science, mathematics and 
language are tested, the reader has to assume that these competencies are crucial to master 
the unidentified challenges. 
 Besides the distinction between obviously important and less important 
competencies, PISA makes a distinction between useful and useless knowledge. There is 
knowledge that is “merely learned,” and there is learned knowledge than can be used in the 
future life of the students (OECD, 2001, p. 14). Again, the distinction is not elucidated, but it 
is nevertheless crucial. Because PISA wants to look at “young people’s ability to use their 
knowledge and skills in order to meet real-life-situations,” the focus is not directed at what 
students learn in school on the basis of their curriculum and textbooks (p. 16). PISA pretends 
to know what young people need to master their lives in the future, but at the same time it 
neglects the question of how students master their lives in their very own present – namely, 
as learning students at school. “Assessments that test only mastery of the school curriculum 
can offer an measure of the internal efficiency of school systems. They do not reveal how 
effectively schools prepare students for life after they have completed their formal 
education” (p. 27).  
 As an empirical research design PISA knows that it cannot disregard student 
experiences, even though it disregards the concrete context of these experiences: the real 
school, its curriculum, its textbooks, etc. In an odd construction PISA offers the following 
solution out of this problem: “PISA offers a new approach to considering school outcomes, 
using as its evidence base the experiences of students across the world rather that in the 
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specific cultural context of a single country” (p. 27). However, the disregard of the national 
curriculum, organization, and textbooks does not stop PISA from thinking of its results as 
being essential to the particular national educational policies. Without these results, PISA 
says, parents, taxpayers, and politicians “lack a means of judging the comparative 
effectiveness of their educational systems” (p. 18).  
 Comparisons are always and are on principle normative. “Normative” means that 
facts are being related to an ideal standard or model. “Comparative” means that different 
facts are related to the same ideal standard or model – philosophers talk about the tertium 
comparitionis as the basic principle of comparison. Regarding achievements, different 
variables such as the curriculum, the textbooks, the actual lessons, the quality of the 
teachers, could be considered, and of course it is only fair to account for the family 
background of the students, too. All these variables composing the tertium comparitionis of 
the comparison are fundamentally empirical, but PISA does not consider them in its 
comparison of achievement. It is only after the results have been engendered, after the 
comparison of cognitive achievement, that PISA turns its interest to some of the empirical 
questions such as family background, gender, or school structures. The question is where this 
tertium comparitionis originates and how it gained such a broad legitimacy, rightly or not. As 
I mentioned in the introduction, my general thesis is that its origins can be found in the Cold 
War ideology of the 1950s. 
 
2. The vision of “One World,” the experts, and the ideology of development 
 After the Second World War, few Americans doubted the supremacy of their nation 
leading the world to enduring peace and welfare. In this context the notion of “One World” 
became popular. It had been used as early as 1943 by the presidential candidate Wendell 
Lewis Willkie, and it indicated the idea of a safe and united world based on the security and 
wellbeing of common people throughout the world, provided by U.S. world leadership 
(Fousek, 2000, p. 79). Annoyingly, one of the former allies, the Soviet Union, had expressed 
similar ambitions on its own agenda and had thus become more and more a distracting factor 
on the global vision of “One World” under the leadership of the United States.  
 In order to tackle the Soviets’ agenda, leading intellectuals in the United States 
constructed an important distinction. The communist ambitions of a united and just world of 
equal citizens were labeled “ideological,” while the western self-perception was deemed to 
be free of ideology. In this context the phrase “the end of ideology” became a popular slogan 
to rally intellectuals worldwide against the Soviet Union’s postwar ideological offense 
(Gilman, 2003, p. 58). This very same idea returned in 1989, by the way, when Francis 
Fukuyama proclaimed the “end of history” after the fall of the Iron Curtain.  
 The self-ascription to be free of ideology was deduced from the self-assessment to be 
the most developed country in the world. Looking at its own history, there was little doubt 
that the United States had solved the major problems of modern societies by far the best. But 
its self-asserted American exceptionalism did not prevent the rise of the idea that at same 
time its unique example was universal and exemplary, too. In other words, the United States 
were both unique and a model for others; it had something to offer the world by its very 
example (Gilman, 2003, p. 63). An expression of this “American nationalist globalism” 
(Fousek, 2000) can be seen as early as in 1947 by the former vice-president of the United 
States, Henry A. Wallace, saying: “By reason of history, geography and sheer economic 
strength America has it in her grasp to furnish that great and last peace which the prophets 
and sages have preached for thousands of years” (quoted in Fousek, 2000, p. 11). The 
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religious language of salvation is not misleading but rather characteristic, as Denis Brogan, a 
British commentator of the United States, noticed in 1957: “The notion of ‘mission’ is far 
wider than it was; the whole world is the parish of the United States as a government and a 
culture” (quoted in Gilman, 2003, p. 69). 
 The globalization of the American self-perception as world model free of ideology has 
served in many international organizations as an indubitable benchmark, precisely because it 
proclaimed to be universal. The key word of this millennium project was development. This 
notion allowed the division of the world in three parts: first the developed countries, thus the 
United States and to a lesser degree Western Europe, then the wrongly developed countries, 
thus the communist, and last the former colonies as underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa, 
and South America. While there was little hope to convince the communist leaders in the 
Soviet Union or in China of the dignity of the Western idea of the end of ideology, American 
leaders began to get more and more involved in developing underdeveloped countries. The 
fact that the Soviet Union had the same strategy for their vision of the end of class society 
caused the manifold problems called the Cold War, with many proxy wars around the globe. 
 The project of developing underdeveloped countries targeted at establishing an 
industrial democracy based on the model of the United States. American experts advised local 
authorities, if necessary in military affairs in order to prevent communist agitation – not 
always successful if we think of the Vietnam tragedy2. The concept of the expert as a key 
actor for development in both, domestic and foreign affair, challenged the democratic 
tradition of the United States that was traditionally characterized as grass-rooted. The 
attractiveness of the expert as a leading figure originated from the perception of an 
increasing complex world and the decreasing faith in popular regimes; Nazi Germany and the 
Soviet Union were seen as possible degenerations of too popular governments that had to be 
bent forward. In this altered understanding, democracy works essentially as a form of 
competition among elites for votes, and therefore democracy is reduced to its procedural 
function of election3. 
 The idea of the expert goes along with the idea that major problems can be solved by 
scientific means, technology, and rational planning. The impressive development in both, 
science and technology, had been perceived as the result of a free people and thus as a core 
part of the American world mission. Therefore, technology was not merely a technical mean 
but a visible token of the universal process towards “One World.” The atomic bomb that 
helped to end the war in Japan was no more than the dot on the ‘i’ of the technological 
sublime in the self-perception of the Americans (Nye, 1994). As early as in 1949, President 
Harry S. Truman said: “The United States is preeminent among nations in the development of 
industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for 
the assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical 
knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible. (…) Greater production is the key to 
prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous 
application of modern scientific and technological knowledge” (quoted in Gilman, 2003, p. 
71). Everything seemed to be basically in order, despite the Korean conflict, the Hungarian 
revolt, and the darkening situation in Vietnam – that is, until a 23-inch metal ball called 
                                                 
2 “After the Korean War, the U.S. foreign economic aid program would become inseparable 
from military concerns” (Gilman, 2003, p. 44). 
3 Not even high voter participation in elections is been sought after, far from it: “That 
democracy is best, in which people participate least,” was the general assumption of the 
expertise-driven democracy in the 1950s (quoted in Gilman, 2003, p. 48). 
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Sputnik was launched by the Soviet Union on October 4, 1957. It was the first satellite, 
respectively the first human-made object, to orbit the earth, and it symbolized the 
superiority of communist technology. The cultural shock of Sputnik effected several 
immediate reactions. One was the foundation of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration NASA in 1958, and another one the passage of the National Defense Education 
Act, or NDEA, by the United States Congress the same year. 
 
3. Sputnik and the educationalization of development: NDEA and OECD 
 The rational for the NDEA was as follows: “The Congress hereby finds and declares 
that the security of the Nation requires the fullest development of the mental resources and 
technical skills of its young men and women” (NDEA, 1958, Sec. 101). As the “defense of this 
Nation depends upon the mastery of modern techniques developed from complex scientific 
principles,” the Congress argues, more young people should be educated in three core 
subjects, namely in “science, mathematics and modern foreign languages and trained in 
technology” (ibid.). Through the lenses of PISA this selection looks quite normal, for the only 
difference is that NDEA fosters foreign languages rather than the native language. However, it 
is worthwhile to remember that, for instance in the eighteenth century, two of those three 
subjects would not even be a part of the compulsory curriculum of the school – namely, 
mathematics and sciences. By contrast, the most important subjects in mass schooling of the 
early modern times, the Catechism and religious songs, have disappeared in this selection in 
the same way as history has disappeared, that important subject in primary and secondary 
education in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In other words, what looks normal 
through the lenses of PISA appears to be normal because it is nothing more than PISA’s very 
own origins. 
 The NDEA was a novelty insofar as for the first time in U.S. history the federal 
government was interfering in educational affairs regarding specific curricular contents 
(Sufrin, 1963, p. 3). NDEA did not just want to support the local and state authorities to 
educate students generally; instead, it connected financial aid to promotion of mathematics, 
sciences, and foreign languages. This interference is a reflection of the above-mentioned shift 
towards elite democracy and faith in experts. Until the NDEA, formal education issues had 
been exclusively in the hands of state, district, and local school boards, who were elected by 
popular vote. But in their attempt to change education in order to combat the national threat 
by the Soviets, the Federal experts obviously challenged this local model of democratic 
control. The instrument of this governmental interference was called “incentive,” a notion 
that has since made a career in educational policy as another notion that described the 
legitimation of this interference, namely “excellence”: “The NDEA emphasizes the pursuit of 
excellence for the individual as the prime defense measure in democracy” (Sufrin, 1963, p. 
16), as one of the defenders of NDEA said. The original two-party ideology, development, and 
“One World” had become a three-party concept – namely education, development, and “One 
World.” And it is this very model that was adopted by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, OECD, and spread all over the globe. 
 The OECD was founded in same year that the NDEA program for financial aid to the 
applying schools started, in 1960. Its first meeting was held in 1961 in Washington, D.C. The 
new strategy of the old endeavor to develop the “One World” can be detected in the title of 
the conference: Policy Conference on Economic Growth and Investment in Education. 
Unmistakably, the political motive behind the conference was the Soviet Union (OECD, 1961, 
p. 5; p. 18; p. 21); the key to success is economic growth. Because education was thought to 
be a “key to more rapid and more meaningful economic growth” in the “age of science” (p. 
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19; p. 21), failing education would cause a stammering economy and make the project of 
“One World” impossible4. However, the scope remained the whole world, not just the 
countries of OECD. In the eyes of the actors, the “more advanced” countries owed help to the 
“underdeveloped areas to assess their present and long-term needs for education in relation 
to economic and other development objectives” (p. 14). 
 A developing economy was still seen as the main engine towards the harmonization of 
the globe, but – to stick to the metaphor – with the Sputnik shock, it was realized that the 
engine needed fuel, and the fuel was educated people. In other words and briefly stated, the 
great Western project of harmonizing the world was educationalized. However, the actors of 
this shift were by no means educationalists, quite on the contrary. As one of the key speakers 
at the conference said, “May I say that, in this context, the fight for education is too 
important to be left solely to the educators” (OECD, 1961, p. 35). Accordingly, the 
conference had brought together “those with policy responsibilities for education and 
national budgets as well as professional economists and experts” (p. 9). Of the four keynote 
speakers one was a lawyer (Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary of State), the second had received his 
university degree in political and social sciences (Thorkill Kristensen, Secretary-General of the 
OECD), and the third and the fourth were economists by training (Philipp Coombs, U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, and Walter H. Heller, Council 
of Economic Advisers to the President of the United States). 
 Accordingly, the major theory that the members at the OECD conference were 
referring to was not primarily an educational but an economical theory: human capital 
theory. Human capital theory had been developed right in the wake of the Sputnik 
consternation and had become highly attractive very quickly. The general postulate of human 
capital theory is that education should be seen not primarily as expenditure but as investment 
with the perspective of benefit. In other words, education has to be seen as investment in 
human beings. “It is only very recent,” Theodore Schultz said in 1962, “that studies of human 
investment have been undertaken. These studies all enter upon empirical research, in 
particular to a separation of acquired from inherited capabilities” in relation to “economic 
growth, structure of wages and salaries, and the distribution of personal income” (Schultz, 
1962, p. 8). Human capital theory is not restricted to the last of these three points, for it has 
an overall scope. “Schooling benefits many persons other than the student. It benefits the 
student’s future children, who will receive informal education in the home; and it benefits 
neighbors, who may be affected favorably by the social values developed in children by the 
schools and even by the quietness of the neighborhood while the schools are in session” 
(Weisbrod, 1962, p. 197). The scope is still the one of earthly redemption to be achieved with 
a major reform in perceiving the potentials of education: “Schools may be viewed as firms 
that specialize in ‘producing’ schooling. The educational establishment, which includes all 
schools, may be viewed as an industry” (Schultz, 1963, p. 4.). 
 
4. The reorganization of the educationalization of development: Output steering 
 The 1961 recipe of both the NDEA and the OECD was what we call today “input 
steering.” Education as investment meant improving teacher education, upgrading the 
                                                 
4 It was made clear that governments needed to invest more money in education in order to 
enforce both “a new level of culture and human dignity” as essentials of a democracy and the 
advancement of science and technology, because the “economic progress is itself increasingly 
dependent on the development of education and on scientific research” (pp. 5f., see pp. 9ff., 
p. 19, p. 21). 
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curriculum and the textbooks in specific eras, and developing learning techniques and 
“learning machines” (OECD, 1961, p. 11f., p. 25). They decided that much more data from 
the individual countries was needed in order to plan in detail educational innovation for 
economical development. The “first importance for sound educational planning and for the 
development of education programmes” was to collect “excellent statistical data in respect 
of pupils, teachers, buildings and finance” in an “international comparable way” (OECD, 
1961, p. 13)5. The general concept was quantitative, not qualitative (ibid., p. 10). 
 Both characteristics of the major concept of securing development by enhanced 
education, its input, and its quantitative orientation, were reversed about 25 years later. The 
turnaround to quality control and output steering was preceded by a new, costly, and 
unsuccessful American campaign for better education after 1980. This campaign had been 
triggered by traumatic events in the late 1960s and 1970s – the OPAC oil embargo, the stock 
market crash, the Vietnam War disaster, the Watergate scandal, the Civil Rights Movements 
and riots, the successful Japanese and then the Korean car industry, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
forming of the explicitly anti-modern Islamic Republic of Iran. Again, the anti-Soviet stimulus 
was used, when a professor of mathematics (Wirszup, 1981) complained in 1981 about “The 
Soviet Challenge. The new mathematics curriculum required of all students in the U.S.S.R. is 
superior to that of any other country” and stated that the “recent Soviet educational 
mobilization … poses a formidable challenge to the national security of the United States” (p. 
360). Based on meanwhile available comparative international data provided by international 
organizations, further scholars witnessed a “striking and highly significant … decline in mean 
scores” in “cognitive achievements” (Lerner, 1982, p. 67; p. 69f.). There was a sobering 
recognition that higher spending on education on the input side of schooling did not 
necessarily affect the quality of achievement on the output side of education (p. 72)6. Two 
major reports in 1983 testified to the ultimate need for educational reform using the 
catchword “excellence.” One of the reports was the famous federal government report, “A 
Nation at Risk,” by the National Commission on Excellence in Education (National 
Commission, 1983), and the other was the Education Commission of the States’ report, 
“Action for Excellence: A Comprehensive Plan to Improve Our Nation’s Schools” (Task Force, 
1983). Both reports started by assessing an economic decline of the U.S. industry as compared 
to other national industries and connected the economic slide to the decline of education7. 
The success of the reports was impressive; a broad campaign for improving education was on 
its way, with millions of dollars to be invested; however, the efforts failed to a large degree, 
and the hopes placed in education were being disappointed once more.  
 What happened now pretty much at the time of the end of the Cold War is intriguing 
and decisive for today’s educational policy in the world. The poor results of the reform 
                                                 
5 And indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s the experts published national reports on the progress of 
educational policy (for a summary of the first reports, see OECD, 1979). 
6 Accordingly, they looked for other variables, which were then summed up to one: “the hard 
work variable” (Lerner, 1982, p. 72), a value that represented the conservative Reagan era 
best. 
7  “In the seventies, productivity in manufacturing industries grew nearly four times as fast in 
Japan, and twice as fast in West Germany and France, as in the United States” (Task Force, 
1983, p. 13). “We live among determined, well-educated, and strongly motivated 
competitors. We compete with them for international standing and markets, not only with 
products but also with the ideas of our laboratories and neighborhood workshops. America’s 
position in the world may once have been reasonably secure with only a few exceptionally 
well-trained men and women. It is no longer” (National Commission, 1983, p. 6). 
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attempts did not lead the experts to reexamine their basic hopes and assumptions about the 
school and education. Instead, they sought new strategies to improve the quality of education 
by enhancing the influence of the experts. In contrast to the decades before, the strategies 
were not headed towards improving the input – that is to say, improving teaching quality, 
curriculum, or textbooks – but instead aimed at changing the governance structure of the 
school in order to improve the quality. In the eyes of the experts, it was actually the locally 
elected school boards that were the culprits in the failing reforms, and not the reform 
concepts themselves. 
 The accusation that the local school boards were the major cause of failing reforms 
signified a dramatic clash between the idea of an elite democracy and the local democracy, 
or between expertise and common sense. The experts did not vacillate and declared the local 
school boards to be “living fossils of an earlier age” (Finn, 1991, p. 32). The influence of 
those fossils should be restricted in order to reach a new balance between state government 
with its experts and the individual school in order to push through the reform programs by 
means of incentives. Therefore, more focus should be placed on output (testing results) than 
on input, as previously. The state governments would then serve as monitoring agencies and 
in this way ensure that state guidelines are met. Accordingly, David Conley, director of the 
Center for Educational Policy Research, states that the school boards will serve the state 
government and its experts rather than the local schools by helping the former to increase 
the accountability of the individual schools, and if they fail to do so, they should be passed 
over by the state (Conley, 2003, p. 146). It is this expert ideology and its strategy to bypass 
the local authorities by isolating the single schools in order to make them accountable to the 
central authorities that is in the background of the PISA program, neglecting real contexts of 
schooling. The euphemist notion of that process is called the autonomy of the single schools.  
 This ideology of reducing local democracy and increasing central experts on the one 
hand, and governing by financial incentives to motivate the single schools for better 
achievement on the other, became the major ideology for the No Child Left Behind Act 
signed by George W. Bush in 2001. The Act obligated schools to achieve minimum standards in 
three tested subjects, mathematics, science, and language8.The very same outline was used 
by the OECD. In contrast to the federal government of the United States, the incentive of 
OECD is not monetary but rather nationalistic, if we look at Germany’s reaction: “The aim is 
clear: 10 years from now Germany has to belong to the five leading educational countries. 
That is why our school system has to bring our children and adolescents to higher education, 
to higher proficiency level, and social competencies. That is exactly what happens in Finland 
and Canada. These countries have to be our measuring stick” (Bildungsministerium 2003, 
cited in Oelkers, 2004, p. 33). 
 
5. Schooling, the culture of testing, and the role of educational research 
 The autonomy of the single schools to achieve minimum standards in a few selected 
fields defined by experts has become the global model of school reform. The unconsidered 
recognition of this American policy shift from input steering to output steering by OECD and 
European experts raises some questions, for it is by no means the ultimate solution. It might 
be unique, but it is by no means a universal model. It is a result of the millennial aspirations 
that became educationalized in the early 1960s in a context in which the federal government 
                                                 
8 With the little Post Cold War specification that the science results are not counted (see 
Garmoran, 2007) 
8  
Harmonizing the Educational Globe  
had no direct instrument for intervening in educational affairs at all. To a European it is 
inconceivable that an American president, as the most powerful man in the world, could not 
be able to direct any school between Maine and California to use a specific textbook in the 
classroom or to increase the weekly school hours even by 10 minutes. In other words: The 
American model of expert-driven standardized assessment of autonomous schools, with an 
equivalent incentive system, only makes sense where central experts feel the need to 
undermine locally elected authorities. Hence, this model is as culturally encoded as any 
other. It is a result of a particular historical process in a specific cultural setting. That the 
agents of this model claim it to be universal, and free of concrete circumstances and 
ideologies, does not help the matter, rather it is no more than the expression of this very 
cultural ideology. 
 It is not incomprehensible that European policy makers were attracted by this 
ideology, sponsored corresponding research projects, and drew pertinent conclusions 
contributing to the educational world polity. Quickly they enlarged the administration 
departments of education with the addition of experts. In Zurich, for example, in the 30 years 
between 1973 and 2003 the number of the staff was quadrupled (Tröhler, 2008). However, 
the policy makers often forgot that in contrast to the United States, they do have relevant 
steering power to enhance schooling in their country fitting their culturally embedded school 
system with its idiosyncrasy. How deeply effective these cultural understandings, institutions, 
and practices are has hardly been evaluated so far. This is astonishing, for the 
materializations of these cultures are just around the corner. One recent study (Overesch, 
2007) examined these cultures by comparing the Finnish and German educational policies 
using quantitative and qualitative methods. It found that despite the primacy of the Finnish 
system, it should not be copied by the Germans. Why not? The author says: “The most 
surprising result of the analysis is: Institutions in terms of historical experiences and cultural 
character are more important for the decision-making processes than institutions in terms of 
the decision rules” (Overesch, 2007, p. 256). The naïve assumption by the planning ideology 
according to which there is an existing problem that has to be solved in a process is being 
reversed. It is the historically grown decision-making processes that define the problem and 
not vice versa (p. 257). Therefore the author traces the success of the Finnish system back to 
a cooperative and nonpartisan culture in the Finnish society that allows a pragmatic 
educational policy. It is precisely this culture that is identified as the reason of the success in 
PISA, a culture that differs to a great degree from the German culture9 fundamentally a 
consensual and pragmatic policy style” (Overesch, 2007, p. 267). . In other words, one can 
transfer formal structures but not cultural experiences molding basic attitudes that predefine 
problems as problems and pertinent solutions. It is this historical cultural legacy that causes 
the phenomenon that the critics I mentioned in the introduction were describing – namely, 
that the global harmonization is limited solely to formal structures and not to inner activities. 
 With this, I by no means advocate pessimism about the qualitative development of 
the schools, neither do I reject large-scale assessments. My question is rather what research 
in education is all in all. Quite obviously it was excluded from all three, the millennial 
ambitions in the Cold War, its educational metamorphosis in the 1960s, and the turnaround to 
quality and output steering in the wake of the end of the Cold War in 1989. Now it has been 
invited to participate in the new governance culture, generating data according to the hardly 
                                                 
9 “The German Bundesländer have a totally different way of decision making in the fields of 
policy. Different values, experiences, interests and styles of negotiation dominate the 
political class that prevents 
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legitimated standards and norms that pretend to be free of ideology and free of the specific 
cultures that students live in. However, this invitation to participate in the construction of  
“One World,” is not solely a friendly act, for the agents of this new governance do not handle 
educational research with kid gloves. Obviously annoyed by the hesitation of research to 
become the helping hand of the new governance culture, OECD started to assess, with the 
help of international experts, the contributions of research to policy makers in the different 
countries. In the case of Switzerland it was said: The “political and administrative entities are 
increasingly in need of scientific findings as a basis for decision-making; they also define 
research desiderata and commission specific research projects and studies. One question in 
this regard is whether the education sciences practised in Switzerland are capable of 
generating the governance knowledge required by policymakers and administrators while 
adequately addressing the issues that are of concern to educational practitioners.” 
(OECD/CERI, 2006, p. 5). 
 It becomes quite obvious that the OECD – based on a very meager educational theory 
of human capital – applies and contributes to a global system of communication about 
education in which numbers are performed with the pretension to cut off any subjectivity or 
particularity (Popkewitz, 2009). If research primarily contributes to this communication in 
good faith to enhance school quality, it will foremost help to suggest a globally standardized 
reality rather than does research on the empirical realities. But these realities exist, and they 
are – as we have seen in even quite similar cultures such as Finland and Germany (both are 
Lutheran dominated cultures) – characterized by cultural differences even in what is 
perceived to be a problem, let alone the solutions. If we become aware of the cultural 
significance of the homecoming queen in an American high school, or the role of ministrant in 
a Catholic context, or the fact that a coach of an American college football team can earn as 
much as 2 million dollars a year, then we start to realize that questions of quality are always 
related to broad cultural expectations about the child, the soul, the future citizen, social 
justice, and peace. These multiple realities are historical products that we need to retrace in 
order to understand them. This is the ultimate purpose of educational history – educational 
history not understood as the story of the past but rather as the story up to the present. This 
power of the silent actors in educational policy, the historically grown cultural expectations 
that affect – directly and indirectly – the constructions of education in their discursive and 
organizational appearances, have certainly not been considered enough. To do this in an 
international comparative way under omission of a de-contextualized and globalized tertium 
comparitionis is a project that against this background almost suggests itself. Where else than 
in small countries such as Luxembourg is one led to become involved in such a project? 
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